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Article 4

Impeachment by Past Conviction: What Hath

Montgomery Wrought?
ROBERT G. SPECTOR*
The use of prior convictions in the impeachment process has been
one of the most difficult and intractible problems of the law of
evidence.' The problem arose as a by-product of the traditional
competency statutes enacted at the end of the nineteenth century.2
Prior to that time any person convicted of a felony was consdered
incompetent to testify. 3 By 1900 all states had enacted statutes
making convicted felons competent to testify, but qualified the
change by providing that those factors which formerly proved incompetency could be used to affect credibility. Those convictions
which, in the past, had kept the witness off the stand were now
admissible to show the witness should not be believed.
Three-quarters of a century's experience with the use of past convictions for impeachment convinced most commentators that the
process involved great risks.' The first of these risks is prejudice.
Assume a testifying criminal defendant is impeached with a past
conviction. There is a risk that the jury will misuse the prior conviction, deciding that the defendant is a bad person who deserves conviction on that basis regardless of the evidence of guilt or innocence. 5
This problem becomes acute when the defendant-witness is impeached by a conviction for the same crime for which he is being
tried. The defendant then runs the risk that the jury will reason that
* Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law. The author wishes to
express his appreciation to Laurie Cray, a third year student at the School of Law, for her
assistance in researching this article.
1. The area has generated a large volume of literature. See, e.g,. Ladd, Credibility Tests
- Current Trends, 89 U.PA.L. REv. 166 (1940); Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017
(1965); Spector, Impeachment Through Past Conviction: A Time For Reform, 18 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1 (1968); Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70
YALE L.J. 763 (1961); Note, Impeachment Under Rule 609(a): Suggestions for Confining and
Guiding Trial Court Discretion, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 655 (1976).
2. 1871-72 II. Laws 405.
3. This disqualification was unnecessary until the seventeenth century. It was not until
then that English law decided that juries should base verdicts only on in court testimony as
opposed to their own prior knowledge. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 17797 (1926).
4. See the discussion in Spector, supra note 1, at 3-8.
5. The strongest data to support this is still the classic study of the jury system of Kalven
and Zeisel. Where the level of evidence is otherwise constant, they report an increase in the
conviction rate of 27% when prior convictions are used for impeachment. H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966).
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if he did it before, he did it again. The second problem is the
"chilling-effect." Since most defendants and their attorneys are extremely skeptical of the jury's ability to relate the prior conviction
only to credibility, they often refuse to tetify.1 As a result, the factfinder often loses crucial information necessary to a verdict. The
third problem is the "associational effect." This occurs when the
defendant's witnesses have criminal records. The jury may associate
the defendant with his witness under a "birds of a feather" theory.7
Traditionally evidence law has taken scant account of these problems. First, the law has presumed that prior convictions are relevant
to credibility. Holmes expressed the traditional justification:
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime,
the only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the
general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be supposed
to show. It is from that general disposition alone that the jury is
asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence
that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that
he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself, and it
reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposition that
he is of bad character and unworthy of credit."
Secondly, evidence law has assumed that if any of the problems
discussed above do appear, they can be dissipated by instructing the
jury to use the prior conviction only for credibility. Presumably, the
jury will follow the judge's instruction and will not use the prior
conviction substantively.'
6. Ninety-one percent of defendants without a record elect to testify, while 74% of defendants with a record elect to testify. Id. at 146.
7. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 609-02 at 59 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as WEINSrEIN]; see People v. DeHoyos, 64 Ill. 2d 128, 355 N.E.2d 19 (1976).
8. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
9. The debate over the use of limiting instructions is well known. While it is clear that
the trial process could not effectively function without the doctrine of multiple admissibility
and the limiting instruction, there are some areas where the risk of jury misunderstanding is
too great. This idea was best expressed in Bruton v. United States:
It is not unreasonable to conclude that in many . . . cases the jury can and will
follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard . . . information. Nevertheless,
...there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.
391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). According to one survey, 98% of the attorneys and 43% of the judges
felt that jurors were unable to follow an instruction to use prior convictions for only credibility. Note, To Take the Stand or Not To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With
a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 215, 218 (1968). It has been suggested that
prosecutors use past convictions in the hope that jurors will misuse the evidence. Hoffman
and Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rxv. 235, 245 (1952). Certainly, law enforcement
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ILLINOIS PRACTICE

Until 1971 Illinois followed the common law and admitted most
convictions for impeachment purposes. The only limitation placed
on admissibility was that the prior conviction had to be for an
infamous crime,'0 thus paralleling the common law incompetency
rule." Illinois courts were fairly strict in adhering to this limitation, 2 and all attempts to limit the type of past convictions which
could be used were rebuffed. Normally appellate courts would hold
that the competency statute mandated admissibility and that the
trial court had no discretion to exclude any conviction of an infamous crime.'" Thus neither the age of a conviction," its pendency
on appeal,' 5 a later pardon,'" or the actual guilt or innocence of the
defendant in the prior proceeding,' 7 had an effect on admissibility.
In 1971, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Montgomery'"
significantly changed the process by requiring a pre-admission finding that the probative value of a prior conviction is not significantly
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The defendant was convicted
of unlawful sale of a narcotic drug in a trial where his twenty-one
year-old robbery conviction had been admitted to impeach him.
The supreme court overturned both the conviction and the longstanding interpretation of the Illinois competency statutes by reinterpreting the phrase "may be shown to affect credibility" to confer
attorneys have played a large part in preventing a reformation of the process. McDonough,
The California Evidence Code: A Precis, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 89, 105 (1967).
10. People v. Kirkpatrick, 413 11. 595, 597, 110 N.E.2d 519, 520 (1953); Bartholomew v.
People, 104 I1. 601, 607-08 (1882).
11. The definition of infamous crime is statutory. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-1
(1977).
12. Examples of non-infamous crimes were disorderly conduct, People v. Beard, 67 Il.
App. 2d 83, 88, 214 N.E.2d 577, 579 (lst Dist. 1966), and conspiracy to defraud, Lamkin v.
Burnett, 7 11. App. 143 (3d Dist. 1880). If the conviction was from another jurisdiction, it
would be admitted if it was similar to a crime listed in the statute. People v. Witherspoon,
27 11. 2d 483, 190 N.E.2d 281 (1963).
13. People v. Buford, 396 Ill. 158, 71 N.E.2d 340 (1947). This former lack of discretion has
since been reaffirmed as to all cases tried before People v. Montgomery, 47 II. 2d 510. 268
N.E.2d 695 (1971). In People v. Ray, 54 Ill. 2d 377, 297 N.E.2d 168 (1973), the supreme court
reversed an appellate court decision which has held that a trial court had discretion to exclude
a 27-year-old armed robbery conviction. People v. Ray, 3 11. App. 3d 517, 278 N.E.2d 170
(3d Dist. 1972). The supreme court noted that prior to 1971, the trial court had to admit all
evidence of prior infamous conviction whenever offered by the prosecutor.
14. In People v. Smith, 90 Il. App. 2d 310, 234 N.E.2d 31 (lst Dist. 1967), the court
approved the admission of a 26-year-old conviction of a crime against nature.
15. People v. Ledferd, 94 Ill. App. 2d 74, 236 N.E.2d 19 (4th Dist. 1968).
16. People v. Andrae, 295 Ill. 445, 129 N.E. 178 (1920).
17. Gallagher v. People, 211 Ill. 158, 71 N.E. 842 (1904). Only if the conviction were a
complete nullity would it be excluded. People v. Shook, 35 Il. 2d 597, 221 N.E.2d 290 (1966).
18. 47 Il1. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
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discretion on the trial judge to decide which convictions should be
admitted. In order to guide the trial court in the exercise of its
discretion, Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609 was adopted. 9
This Rule is basically a codification of the "Luck" doctrine as developed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
In Luck v. United States,2 0a District of Columbia statute, identical to Illinois', was interpreted to allow the trial judge discretion in
admitting past convictions for impeachment. The doctrine was refined in Gordon v. United States,2' which listed factors to be considered by the trial judge in determining whether the probative value
of the conviction is substantially outweighed by its prejudice. The
factors are: 2
1. The type of crime. Generally those crimes involving dishonest
conduct have probative value on the witness' credibility.
2. Time of conviction. The more remote a conviction, the less
probative value it has.
3. Subsequent history of the defendant. If the defendant-witness
has a clean record since the conviction, the conviction has less probative value.
4. Similarity of past conviction. The greater the similarity between the past crime and the present charge, the greater the prejudice. As a general rule, such convictions should rarely be admitted.
5. Importance of the defendant's testimony. In cases where the
defendant has information unavailable through other witnesses, he
19.

The sections of proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609 applicable to this article are:
Rule 609: Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of a Crime (a) General Rule.
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but only if
the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of
punishment unless (3) in either case, the judge determines that the probative value
of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. (b) Time Limit. Evidence. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is
not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of
conviction or the release of the witness from prison, whichever is the later date.
The Federal Rule underwent a number of different drafts and the present Rule 609 is
considerably different from the version adopted in Montgomery. See Tobias, Impeachment
of the Accused by Prior Conviction and the Proposed FederalRules: The Tortured Path of
Rule 609, Hearings before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal CriminalLaws of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on proposed FederalRules of Evidence,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 2, p. 105 (1973). The Illinois Supreme Court has been quite
explicit in noting that any subsequent changes in the Federal Rule have no effect on what
was adopted in Montgomery. See People v. Ray, 54 Ill. 2d 377, 297 N.E.2d 168 (1973).
20. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
21. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
22. Id., at 940-41.
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should be encouraged to take the stand. This may mean that the
judge should exercise his discretion to exclude prior convictions.
6. Posture of the case. If the case turns on the credibility of
opposing witnesses, prior convictions may be needed to assess the
worth of each witness.
Montgomery quoted extensively from the Comments to the Proposed Federal Rule,2 which in turn quoted extensively from the
Gordon opinion. It is reasonable to assume that Illinois adopted the
Luck-Gordon doctrine through its adoption of the Proposed Federal
Rule. In Montgomery the conviction was reversed because the
defendant-witness' past conviction was outside the ten year rule of
subsection (b).
The issues raised in Montgomery have been extensively litigated
in the ensuing eight years. 24 The remainder of this article examines
the performance of Illinois courts in handling this problem.
APPLICABILITY OF MONTGOMERY

The Montgomery doctrine is applicable when there is an attempt
to impeach a witness by using a prior conviction to show that the
witness is a bad person and therefore should not be believed.3. It is
not applicable if the conviction is offered for another purpose. For
example, if the defendant testifies that he has no prior convictions,
any past conviction may be offered to show the defendant is biased.2 1 However, if the prior incident did not result in a conviction
it is inadmissible regardless of the probative value of the underlying

incident.27
Montgomery itself involved a testifying defendant, and initially
there was some confusion as to whether the doctrine was applicable
to other witnesses. Gradually Montgomery was extended to the im-29
2
peachment of a defendant's witness, and a prosecution witness.
In one rather unusual case the supreme court applied the doctrine
to the prosecution's attempt to reveal the prior convictions of its
own witness. The prosecution's witness had a long prior association
with the defendant, and the court was concerned that the defendant
23. People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 517-18, 268 N.E.2d 695, at 699-700 (1971).
24. There have been well over 80 cases interpreting and applying the Montgomery standards.
25. People v. Brown, 61 Ill. App. 3d 180, 377 N.E.2d 1201 (1st Dist. 1978); People v. Peery,
41 111. App. 3d 533, 354 N.E.2d 536 (1st Dist. 1976); People v. Dietschweiler, 21 Ill. App. 3d
707, 315 N.E.2d 585 (Ist Dist. 1974).
26. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
27. See Schoolfield v. Witkowski, 54 Ill. App. 2d 111, 203 N.E.2d 460 (1st Dist. 1964).
28. People v. Barnett, 34 Il. App. 3d 174, 340 N.E.2d 116 (1st Dist. 1975).
29. People v. Stewart, 54 Ill. App. 3d 76, 369 N.E.2d 131 (1st Dist, 1977).
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might be tarred with the witness' prior convictions because of their
past association.30 Montgomery is now also applicable in civil
:
cases.
Time Limitations
Montgomery placed certain convictions beyond the limit of the
trial court's discretion. The doctrine excludes all convictions more
than ten years old, measured from the date of conviction or the date
of release from prison, whichever is later.3" Illinois courts have
strictly adhered to this time limit, finding it crucial to prevent abuse
of the limitation by trial courts.33
There has been some litigation concerning the measurement of
the ten year period. The applicable period is from conviction or
release date to the moment when the conviction is offered into evidence. The fact that the crime for which the defendant-witness is
being tried occurred within the ten year period is irrelevant..3 4 Occasionally a question arises as to the effect of probation or parole. In
a 1971 case, a defendant-witness had a prior burglary conviction
from 1958. Although initially granted probation, he was sentenced
to the penitentiary when he violated his probation. He was released
from prison in 1962. The court held his conviction admissible, relating the sentence for probation violation back to the original burglary
conviction and reasoning that the defendant was released from
30. People v. DeHoyos, 64 Il1. 2d 128, 355 N.E.2d 19 (1976).
31. The appellate courts originally split on this issue. Compare Charlton v. Baker, 36 111.
App. 3d 427, 344 N.E.2d 25 (2d Dist. 1976) (Montgomery applicable) with Knowles v. Panopoulos, 34 Ill. App. 3d 90, 339 N.E.2d 547 (1st Dist. 1975) (Montgomery inapplicable). The
supreme court finally held that Montgomery applied every time a past conviction was used
to attack the witness' credibility. Knowles v. Panopoulos, 66 Ill. 2d 585, 363 N.E.2d 805
(1977).
32. The use by the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence of the release date is puzzling.
The feature continues in the current Federal Rules. No attempt has ever been made to justify
it. Given the differences in parole practices and sentencing standards, the use of a prison
release date as a terminus point makes little sense.
33. "We consider it clearly important that the use of convictions for impeachment purposes should be governed. . . by the 10-year limit established in Rule 609(b)." People v. Ray,
54 Il1. 2d 377, 383, 297 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1973). See also People v. Cox, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1033,
293 N.E.2d 727 (4th Dist. 1972), where the court reversed when the prior convictions were
more than 10 years old and there was no evidence that the defendant was released within
the 10 year period. A court will not even presume that the witness served the minimum
sentence on his prior conviction, if the date of the conviction is more than 10 years old. In
one case the use of a 10 year, 11 month old conviction was held reversible error because the
proponent of the conviction could not show that any time had been served. People v. Yost,
__
Ill. App. 3d __,
382 N.E.2d 140 (3d Dist. 1978). See also McIntyre v. Wood River
Towing Co., 37 I1. App. 3d 488, 346 N.E.2d 420 (5th Dist. 1976).
34. People v. Owens, 46 Ill. App. 3d 978, 361 N.E.2d 644 (1st Dist. 1977).
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prison during the ten year period. 5
Beyond the ten year limitation, the date of the conviction is a
factor which the trial judge should consider in determining whether
the conviction has sufficient probative value to be admitted. :" Appellate courts have not generally considered this factor to be very
important when reviewing an exercise of discretion by a trial court
judge. Eight and nine-year-old convictions have frequently been
admitted.3 7 So long as the conviction or release falls within the ten
year period, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's
3
ruling on the factor. 1
Nature of Conviction
One of the factors that Montgomery, by adopting Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609, directs the trial judge to consider is the
nature of the past conviction. Within Rule 609 there are two classes
of crimes that may be considered for admission: all crimes punishable in excess of one year in the penitentiary and all crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement. However, no prior conviction is admissible if its probative value for credibility is substantially outweighed by its prejudice. According to Gordon v. United States,31
probative value must be measured by the relationship between the
prior crime and testimonial veracity. Thus crimes involving violence
have little value in measuring truthfulness, while crimes involving
dishonest conduct have a close relationship to credibility." Regard35. People v. Overturf, 12 I11.App. 3d 441, 299 N.E.2d 34 (4th Dist. 1973). See also People
v. Owens, 58 Ill. App. 3d 37, 373 N.E.2d 848 (4th Dist. 1978). The defendant-witness had a
1962 conviction for burglary for which he received a sentence of a year's probation. He
violated probation and was sentenced to a term of one to ten years. He was paroled twice
and each time violated parole and was recommitted. He was released in 1968. The court
reasoned that this was well within the ten year period at his 1976 trial. The defendant's
argument that his resentencing was for a violation of probation and not for the original offense
was rejected by the court.
36. People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 510, 518, 268 N.E.2d 695, 700 (1971).
37. E.g., People v. Nicks, 23 Ill. App. 3d 443, 319 N.E.2d 524 (4th Dist. 1974); People v.
Semma, 19 11. App. 3d 776, 312 N.E.2d 746 (1st Dist. 1974); People v. Havener, 13 11. App.
3d 312, 300 N.E.2d 43 (4th Dist. 1973).
38. E.g., People v. Ganter, 56 Ill. App. 3d 316, 371 N.E.2d 1072 (1977). "Defendant also
claims that since 5 years had passed between the prior conviction and the defendant's second
trial, the trial judge should have ruled against use of the prior conviction. The 5-year interval
satisfies the guidelines set forth in People v. Montgomery.
Id. at 327, 371 N.E.2d at
1080.
39. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967). As noted above, proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
609, adopted in Montgomery, is practically a codification of the Gordon holding. Many
Illinois courts have recognized that fact and treated the Gordon opinion as if Montgomery
had incorporated its language. See, e.g., People v. Ridley, 25 Il1. App. 3d 596, 323 N.E.2d
577 (st Dist. 1975); People v. Hodges, 21 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 314 N.E.2d 8 (3d Dist. 1975).
40. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.Cir. 1967).
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less of whether the conviction is for a crime punishable by more than
one year in the penitentiary or involved dishonesty, the judge must
still determine if it is the type of crime which has any probative
value on the question of whether the witness is lying. Illinois courts
have had great difficulty in determining this question. The cases
indicate that reviewing courts have not only failed to supervise the
type of crime admitted by the trial courts, but have encouraged
wide admission of prior convictions to the point where the
Montgomery guidelines have become practically meaningless.
The first problem faced by the appellate courts was whether the
"infamous crime" standard of the common law was still applicable
after Montgomery. While most courts concluded that it was not
necessary for the prior conviction to be of an infamous crime, 4 the
42 the
issue was not resolved until 1977. In Knowles v. Panopoulos,
supreme court affirmed an appellate court opinion" which had refused to allow a conviction for criminal trespass to an automobile
to impeach a witness on the ground that Montgomery did not apply
to a civil case. Therefore, the appellate court reasoned that the
infamous crime standard controlled, excluding the misdemeanor
conviction. Although it reached the same result, the supreme court
disapproved of the appellate court's reasoning. The Montgomery
rationale was applicable to all judicial proceedings and therefore the
"infamous crime" standard was inapplicable. The conviction was
excluded by the application of proposed Rule 609."1
The major difficulty faced by Illinois courts is the determination
of what crimes relate to the credibility of a witness. As stated by the
Knowles court: "[Tihe court must be more concerned with ascertaining the truth and should not allow into evidence a conviction
which does not reasonably relate to testimonial deceit.' 5 Over the
course of many opinions the appellate courts have gradually evolved
a catalog of admissible prior convictions. As might be expected, any
crime which involves some factor of dishonesty or taking of property
is thought to satisfy the Montgomery guidelines. Thus courts have
approved the admissibility of prior convictions for armed robbery,4 6
41. "[Ilt is unnecessary for a crime to be characterized as infamous to be available for
impeachment purposes." People v. Legear, 29 Ill. App. 3d 884, 891, 331 N.E.2d 659, 664 (2d
Dist. 1975). See also People v. Peery, 41 Ill. App. 3d 533, 354 N.E.2d 536 (1st Dist. 1976);
Charlton v. Baker, 36 Ill. App. 3d 427, 344 N.E.2d 25 (2d Dist. 1976); People v. Barnett, 34
Ill. App. 3d 174, 340 N.E.2d 116 (1st Dist. 1975).
42. 66 I1. 2d 585, 363 N.E.2d 805 (1977).
43. Knowles v. Panopoulos, 34 I1. App. 3d 90, 339 N.E.2d 547 (1st Dist. 1975).
44. 66 Il. 2d at 589-90, 363 N.E.2d at 808.
45. Id. at 589, 363 N.E.2d at 808.
46. "Although robbery involves violence, it is violence employed to a dishonest end, that
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burglary, 7 larceny,4 8 theft, 9 forgery,5" possession of a car with altered serial numbers, 5 attempted robbery, '" receiving stolen property,"1 and conspiracy to perjure. 5 The only crime involving dishonesty as to which there has been disagreement is misdemeanor theft.
In People v. Rudolph, 55 Justice McGloon dissented from a decision
approving the use of misdemeanor theft for impeachment purposes.5" He suggested that crimes involving dishonesty refers only to
those crimes committed by representational falsehoods. There is
considerable support for this point of view. Those crimes listed as
involving "dishonesty" by the Advisory Committee to the Federal
Rules of Evidence are perjury, counterfeiting, and forgery.57 These
crimes involve aspects of lying and not just stealing. It seems relatively clear that such crimen falsi have a considerably higher probative value on the question of credibility. The inquiry, however, is
whether stealing crimes involving a punishment of less than one
year have sufficient probative value to be admitted. The resolution
of this question is unclear in federal courts.5 8 Justice McGloon's
dissent has been adopted by the Fifth Appellate District,"9 but has
is, stealing by violent means." People v. Ridley, 25 I1. App. 3d 596, 601, 323 N.E.2d 577, 581
(1st Dist. 1975). See also People v. Fletcher, 59 Ill. App. 3d 310, 375 N.E.2d 1333 (1st Dist.
1978).
47. "While there may be those who would suggest that a conviction for burglary does not
reflect adversely on the honesty and veracity of a defendant, it can at least be said that he
does not come well recommended." People v. Dailey, 15 Il1. App. 3d 214, 218, 304 N.E.2d
156, 159 (4th Dist. 1973). See also People v. Gentry, 19 Ill. App. 3d 861, 312 N.E.2d 441 (4th
Dist. 1974); People v. Mikrut, 19 Ill. App. 3d 516, 311 N.E.2d 728 (2d Dist. 1974); People v.
Overturf, 12 I1. App. 3d 441, 299 N.E.2d 34 (4th Dist. 1973).
App. 3d 166, 308 N.E.2d 18 (1st Dist. 1974).
48. People v. Partee, 17 Ill.
49. People v. Moyer, 60 I1. App. 3d 543, 377 N.E.2d 378 (4th Dist. 1978); Pratt v. Bartoli,
55 Ill. App. 3d 884, 371 N.E.2d 359 (3d Dist. 1977); People v. Graham, 27 11. App. 3d 408,
327 N.E.2d 261 (5th Dist. 1975).
50. People v. Petty, 3 Ill. App. 3d 951, 279 N.E.2d 509 (4th Dist. 1972).
51. People v. Snow, 21111. App. 3d 873, 316 N.E.2d 216 (4th Dist. 1974).
App. 3d 884, 331 N.E.2d 659 (2d Dist. 1975).
52. People v. Legear, 29 Ill.
App. 3d 174, 340 N.E.2d 116 (1st Dist. 1975).
53. People v. Barnett, 34 Ill.
54. People v. Callinan, 44 I1. App. 3d 18, 357 N.E.2d 1291 (3d Dist. 1976).
55. 50 I1. App. 3d 559, 365 N.E.2d 930 (1st Dist. 1977). See also People v. Morstatter, 48
Ill. App. 3d 187, 362 N.E.2d 809 (4th Dist. 1977), where the court described misdemeanor
theft as a classic example of a crime that affects credibility.
App. 3d 559, 570, 365 N.E.2d 930, 940 (1st Dist. 1977).
56. People v. Rudolph, 50 Ill.
57. FED. R. EVID. 609(a), Advisory Comm. Notes.
58. Compare Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278 (3rd Cir. 1976) (inadmissible) with
United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976) (admissible).
59. People v. Vaughn, 56 11. App. 3d 700, 371 N.E.2d 1248 (5th Dist. 1978). Recently, a
different panel of the First Appellate District disagreed with the Rudolph majority. In People
, 385 N.E.2d 12 (1st Dist. 1978), the court adopted the
Ill. App. 3d v. Malone, __
McGloon dissent and held that a conviction for misdemeanor theft was not admissible under
Montgomery. The First District is now divided against itself. This division should be resolved,
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been rejected elsewhere. 0
Unfortunately, Illinois courts have broadened the categories of
admissible convictions far beyond those involving stealing or lying.
In doing so they have either supplied no rationale or a rationale that
seems inconsistent with Montgomery. Drug-related crimes are an
example. In People v. Sawyer,' decided only three months after
Montgomery, the supreme court indicated that a conviction for possession of narcotics would be admissible to impeach, although it did
not say how this crime related to truth-telling. Without citing
Sawyer, the First Appellate District and the Fifth Appellate District proceeded to split on the admissibility of narcotics convictions.
The Fifth District affirmed a motion in limine granted by the trial
judge to exclude a four-year-old conviction for possession of heroin.
It concluded that the prejudice to the witness was too great, since
the jury might assume that once a person is an addict he remains
an addict.2 In contrast the First District held that a conviction for
possession of heroin was properly admissible. 3 The reasoning in the
case was less than adequate: "The offense of possession of heroin
does indicate a disposition to place the advancement of individual
self-interest ahead of principle or the interest of society, and such
proof may suggest a willingness to do so again on the witness
stand." 4 This reasoning would reverse the clock and take Illinois
back to the pre-Montgomery cases. Any conviction arguably shows
an interest in placing the individual over society, and thus all convictions have probative value. The Montgomery balancing standard
would no longer be needed, since all convictions would reflect on
credibility.
Other courts have approved decisions of trial courts which admitted evidence of violent crimes. Two First District cases approved
denial of motions in limine that sought to exclude prior rape convictions." Both cases indicated that the trial judge had considerable
discretion in granting or denying the motion. One of the cases acas it is likely to create confusion at the trial court level.
60. People v. Spates, 62 I1. App. 3d 890, 379 N.E.2d 869 (2d Dist. 1978); People v.
App. 3d 402, 374 N.E.2d 743 (lst Dist. 1978). This divergence between
Thomas, 58 Ill.
appellate districts is to be expected. Even under Federal Rule 609, which allows the federal
trial courts less discretion, the circuits have differed as to which convictions are admissible.
See WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, 609[03a] at 72.
61. 48 Ill. 2d 127, 268 N.E.2d 689 (1971).
App. 3d 861, 366 N.E.2d 980 (5th Dist. 1977).
62. Baldwin v. Huffman Towing Co., 51 Ill.
App. 3d 934, 335 N.E.2d 79 (1st Dist. 1975).
63. People v. Nelson, 31 Ill.
64. Id. at 938, 335 N.E.2d at 83.
65. People v. Sanders, 37 Ill. App. 3d 236, 345 N.E.2d 757 (1st Dist. 1976); People v.
Barksdale, 24 111.App. 3d 489, 321 N.E.2d 489 (lst Dist. 1974).
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cepted the State's argument that there was a definite relationship
between the commission of an infamous crime and testimonial credibility." Neither case suggests any rationale which a trial judge
could have used to find rape probative of credibility. In another
First District opinion a prior rape conviction was actually admitted. "7 It was a short step from that decision to applying the rationale
of the heroin cases to other crimes. Thus the First District rationalized the admission of a prior conviction for aggravated battery on
the ground that:
Prior convictions for crimes other than for an offense based on
dishonesty or false statements have been held admissible on the
theory that they establish a disposition on the part of the defendant to place the advancement of this individual self-interest
ahead of the interest of society, and such proof may suggest a
willingness to do so again on the witness stand."'
This reasoning was vigorously criticized by Justice Craven of the
Fourth Appellate District. In People v. Wright, 9 the defendant was
convicted of rape and attempted deviate sexual assault in a trial
where his past convictions for aggravated battery were used for impeachment. The conviction was reversed although the two reversing
judges could not agree on the reason. Justice Craven wrote that the
prior convictions had no bearing on honesty or veracity:
[W]e cannot conceive of what there is about the crime of aggravated battery which is at all probative of the defendant's honesty
and veracity as a witness. Balancing zero probative value against
the obvious danger of prejudice inherent when the jury is informed
that the defendant is a convicted felon, we conclude that the danger of prejudice clearly outweighs the probative value of the two
prior convictions.70
Unfortunately both the specially concurring and dissenting justices disagreed with this interpretation of Montgomery. Justice
Reardon said:
I view a witness in this posture - he comes before the jury after
being sworn upon his solemn oath to tell the truth and he seeks to
66. People v. Sanders, 37 Ill. App. 3d 236, 238, 345 N.E.2d 757, 759 (1st Dist. 1976).
67. People v. Woods, 41 111. App. 3d 29, 353 N.E.2d 304 (1st Dist. 1976). The Fourth
Ill.
District has also approved the admissibility of a rape conviction. People v. Warfel, App. 3d -, 385 N.E.2d 175 (4th Dist. 1979).
68. People v. Kitchen, 53 Ill. App. 3d 521, 523-24, 368 N.E.2d 528, 531 (lst Dist. 1977).
The rationale is, of course, the same as that offered by Holmes for the pre-Montgomery
common law approach. See note 8 supra.
69. 51 111. App. 3d 461, 366 N.E.2d 1058 (4th Dist. 1977).
70. Id. at 465, 366 N.E.2d at 1062.
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have the jury believe that to which he is testifying. His credibility,
therefore, is essential to a proper interpretation of every word that
he utters. A failure to inform the trier of facts of the defendant's
previous disrespect for societal orders denies to the jury the basis
upon which credibility can be weighed and evaluated. 7'
He thought that the proper interpretation of Montgomery is that
any offense resulting in imprisonment for more than one year is
presumed to relate to truthfulness and veracity. This approach was
later adopted by another Fourth District case."
Thus in the First and Fourth Appellate Districts we have come
full circle. Montgomery was originally thought of as an opinion
which restricted the number and type of admissible convictions.
This was further emphasized by Knowles, which clearly indicated
that unless the conviction related to testimonial deceit, it should not
be admitted. It hardly seems appropriate to implement these holdings by saying that all convictions relate to testimonial deceit. If
that was the case there would have been little reason for the
Montgomery decision in the first place.
The opinions of the First and Fourth Appellate Districts fail to
comprehend the meaning of the term probative value. It is the tendency of an item of evidence to prove that for which it is introduced.
In this area the evidence is offered to show the witness unbelievable.
Thus that which is introduced must have some relation to the ability of the witness to tell the truth. If the prior conviction was not
for a crime involving truth-telling, it is difficult to see that it has
any probative value for impeachment. This relationship of character to the point being proved is well recognized in other areas. A
defendant in a criminal case cannot just introduce evidence of his
good character. He may only introduce evidence of a character trait
which is pertinent to the crime charged.7 3 Evidence of other character traits is inadmissible since it lacks probative value. There is no
reason why the same relevancy equation should not apply in the
impeachment area.
Justice Reardon's comment, that a failure to inform the jury of
the defendant's disrespect for society denies it the basis upon which
credibility can be evaluated, seems misplaced. It assumes that any
71. Id. at 466, 366 N.E.2d at 1063.
72. People v. Guthrie, 60 Ill. 3d 293, 376 N.E.2d 425 (4th Dist. 1978).
73. See, e.g., People v. Partee, 17 I1. App. 3d 166, 308 N.E.2d 18 (1st Dist. 1974). See
also Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a)(1): "Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same."
74. The difficulty of Justice Reardon's argument was best pointed out by Bentham:
Take homicide in the way of duelling. Two men quarrel; one of them calls the other
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disrespect for societal order has a relationship to truth-telling. However, not every such disrespect for society is admissible; only convictions can be admitted. There may be clear and convincing evidence
that the witness has defrauded the government, yet unless he has
been convicted it is not admissible. 5 Thus not everything that
"helps" evaluate credibility can be admitted. These two appellate
districts are headed in the wrong direction."
Similarity of the Past Conviction
According to Montgomery, the similarity of the prior conviction
to the crime the defendant is charged with is a factor to be considered by the trial judge.77 This factor operates on the prejudice side
of the balance. If the prior conviction is similar to the present
charge, the jury may attribute to the defendant a character trait for
a liar. So highly does he prize the reputation of veracity, that, rather than suffer a
stain to remain upon it, he determines to risk his life, challenge his adversary to
fight, and kills him. Jurisprudence, in its sapience, knowing no difference between
homicide by consent, by which no other human being is put in fear - and homicide
in pursuit of a scheme of highway robbery, of noctural (sic] housebreaking, by
which every man who has a life is put in fear of it, - has made the one and the
other murder, and consequently felony. The man prefers death to the imputation
of a lie, - and the inference of the law is, that he cannot open his mouth but lies
will issue from it. Such are the inconsistencies which are unavoidable in the application of any rule which takes improbity for a ground of exclusion.
7 J. BNrTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 406 (Browning ed. 1827), quoted in 2 Wigmore,
Evidence, § 519 at 611 (3d ed. 1940).
75. E.g., Schoolfield v. Witkowski, 54 Ill. App. 2d 111, 203 N.E.2d 460 (1st Dist. 1964).
This rule is very well established in Illinois. The proposed Illinois Rules of Evidence would
continue this approach by rejecting Federal Rule 608(b) which allows cross-examination of a
witness about prior instances of bad conduct which relate to truthfulness and veracity.
76. The First and Fourth District had articulated another line of reasoning which could
be used to subvert the Montgomery guidelines. In People v. Blythe, 17 Ill. App. 3d 768, 308
N.E.2d 675 (4th Dist. 1974), the defendant was indicated for murder and claimed self-defense.
The Fourth Appellate District affirmed a trial court decision admitting two prior Tennessee
convictions for manslaughter and assault with a dangerous weapon. The court thought that
the two convictions were probative because "the two Tennessee convictions, being crimes of
violence, do have a bearing directly upon the credibility of the defendant's contention that
he killed in self-defense and the credibility of his evidence supporting that defense." Id. at
770-71, 308 N.E.2d at 678. This reasoning was adopted by the First Appellate District in
People v. Kitchen, 53 Il. App. 3d 521, 368 N.E.2d 528 (1st Dist. 1977).
Blythe was limited to its own facts in People v. Wright, 51 Ill. App. 3d 461, 366 N.E.2d
1058 (4th Dist. 1977). Justice Craven correctly noted that while the statement in Btythe is
couched in terms of credibility, it is really a case admitting past crime to show defendant's
propensity to commit crime. Of course, this is highly improper. Neither the concurring nor
the dissenting judge disagreed with this aspect of Justice Craven's opinion, and it seems fair
to assume that the Blythe approach has been rejected in the Fourth Appellate District.
However, this hardly seems of much importance given the tendency of the First and Fourth
Districts to find any conviction probative of credibility. Blythe will remain a dead letter
unless it is resurrected by another appellate district.
77. People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 518, 268 N.E.2d 695, 700 (1971).
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that type of crime. This greatly increases the risk that the jury will
convict based on what it feels is the defendant's propensity to commit that type of crime." In Gordon, Judge Burger suggested that,
"As a general guide, those convictions which are for the same crime
should be admitted sparingly; . . . and then only when the circumstances indicate strong reasons for disclosure, and where the conviction directly relates to veracity."7 9
Unfortunately this aspect of the balancing process has not operated effectively in Illinois. Many cases have allowed impeachment
by a conviction for the same crime or for a crime similar to the crime
charged. While similarity is discussed in a number of cases, 0 the
courts always admit the past conviction if it relates to the veracity
of the witness. Since the courts apparently believe that almost any
felony relates to credibility, the similarity factor has completely
failed to influence decisions in this area."'
Other Factors
All remaining considerations mentioned in the Gordon opinion
appear to have had no effect on Illinois decisions. This is indeed
strange, especially with respect to the factor of the need for defendant's testimony. The impetus to allow the jury more information
was one of the main reasons for the Luck-Gordon doctrine in the
first place.12 Yet whenever this point has been raised in Illinois, the
78. Prior conviction or acts are, of course, inadmissible to prove the defendant's propensity to commit crime. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 17 Ill. 2d 253, 259, 161 N.E.2d 268, 271
(1959); FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
79. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.Cir. 1967).
80. E.g., People v. Dee, 26 Ill. App. 3d 691, 325 N.E.2d 336 (1st Dist. 1975); People v.
Ridley, 25 Il. App. 3d 596, 323 N.E.2d 577 (1st Dist. 1975).
81. Research has produced only one case where the trial judge's decision to admit a past
conviction, within the ten year rule, has been reversed. In People v. Everhart, 22 Ill. App. 3d
727, 317 N.E.2d 720 (1st Dist. 1974), the defendant appealed his conviction for indecent
liberties with a minor, contending the court erred in admitting his prior conviction for the
same crime for impeachment purposes. The First Appellate District agreed, and, in view of
the State's weak case, reversed the trial court. This decision is an anomoly among the many
cases interpreting Montgomery. It has been somewhat isolated and it is questionable whether
it survives more recent First District cases. See notes 63-76 supra and accompanying text.
Other examples of cases admitting similar prior convictions are: People v. Chatman, 52 Il1.
App. 3d 631, 367 N.E.2d 1050 (3d Dist. 1977) (rape conviction-rape charged); People v.
Holman, 43 IIl. App. 3d 56, 356 N.E.2d 1115 (2d Dist. 1976) (robbery conviction-robbery
charged); People v. Overturf, 12 Ill.
App. 3d 441, 299 N.E.2d 34 (4th Dist. 1973) (burglary
conviction-burglary charged).
82. Indeed, according to one version of the Luck-Gordon doctrine it was the sine qua non
of its existence. Evans v. United States, 397 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1968), indicated that the
defendant had to show a need for his testimony before the judge would consider the other
factors. Later cases disagreed with the holding and the question was never fully resolved. See
Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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response has been the traditional argument that if the defendant
chooses to take the stand he can be impeached like all other witnesses.8 3 The other factors, the subsequent history of the defendant
and the posture of the case, have been barely mentioned in the
opinions.81
THE PROCESS OF PROOF

The Motion In Limine
Montgomery did not address the problem of when the trial judge
was to decide whether a past conviction should be admitted. Obviously the judge could decide the question when an objection is
made. Gordon suggested it would be preferable "for the District
Judge. . .to have the accused take the stand in a non-jury hearing
and elicit his testimony and allow cross examination before resolving the Luck issue. 8' 5 In Illinois an objection can be made when the
prior conviction is introduced or the opponent of the conviction may
make a motion in limine asking the trial judge to exclude the prior
convictions. Decision of the motion is discretionary with the trial
court judge. 6 While most appellate courts seem to agree that the
pre-trial ruling is the preferable way to handle the Montgomery
problem, 7 there appears to be no way to force the trial court to make
the ruling. This is particularly unfortunate, since the decision of a
criminal defendant to testify is one of the major decisions in planning a defense. In order to make the decision intelligently, the defendant must know what the consequences, if any, will be. There
may well be cases where the trial judge will not be able to make a
83. People v. Austin, 37 Ill. App. 3d 569, 346 N.E.2d 166 (2d Dist. 1976). In one case the
court said that the prejudice to the prosecutor would be obvious if it could not attack the
defendant with evidence of past convictions. People v. Axelson, 37 I1. App. 3d 566, 346
N.E.2d 24 (2d Dist. 1976).
84. See People v. Vaughn, 56 Ill. App. 3d 700, 371 N.E.2d 1248 (5th Dist. 1978), where
the court, while holding a conviction for misdemeanor theft inadmissible, noted that in this
case the witness had a clean record for the past nine years. In the recent case of People v.
Thomas, 58 Il1. App. 3d 402, 374 N.E.2d 743 (1st Dist. 1978), the court used the fact that the
prosecution had consistently pitted the credibility of its chief witness against the defendant
as a reason why the defendant should have been allowed to use a prior conviction for misdemeanor theft.
85. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967). A full scale hearing
eliciting the defendant's testimony can be quite time consuming. One case from the District
of Columbia noted that the hearing took a day and half. Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d
287 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
86. "The trial court in its discretion may desire to grant such a motion, deny the same,
or withhold its ruling until further evidence is heard.
...
People v. Ray, 3 II1. App. 3d 517,
523, 278 N.E.2d 170, 174 (3d Dist. 1972).
87. People v. Murdock, 50 Ill. App. 3d 198, 365 N.E.2d 1301 (3d Dist. 1977).
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ruling until trial. These will be cases where the need for the defendant's testimony and the posture of the case factors appear crucial.
However, if neither of these considerations are present there is no
reason why a trial judge should not make a ruling on the motion in
limine. Most other jurisdictions that have discussed this problem
suggest it is the rare case where the ruling should be reserved until
trial."
Since most Illinois cases have not considered the need for the
defendant's testimony or the posture of the case important, they
should decide the defendant's motion prior to the defendant's testimony. It seems particularly egregious to hold, as in People v.
Barksdale,89 that the trial judge would have any additional information available to him at that point. Indeed, given that the defendant
was being tried for rape and the prior conviction was also for rape
there was every reason to decide to exclude the past conviction. The
crime was a violent one and identical to the criminal charge. Reserving a ruling until the conclusion of the defendant's testimony places
him in an unconscionable dilemma. Relief of this dilemma was the
original foundation of the Luck-Gordon doctrine. The Fifth Appellate District has taken a more realistic approach:
[11n some cases it may be necessary for the trial court, on proper
motion, to make a ruling on the use of a prior conviction before the
beginning of the trial, especially where good reasons are shown that
defense counsel's trial strategy will depend upon the ruling. However, under the circumstances of the instant case, in which defense
counsel offered no such reasons, the refusal of the trial court to
make the pretrial ruling was not error. Defendant could still have
obtained an advance ruling on the matter by renewing his motion
at some point during the trial.9 0
Thus the trial judge should rule upon a proper motion and in any
event, the defendant is entitled to some ruling before taking the
stand. Once again the Fifth Appellate District's views have made
little headway with the other districts."
88. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 217 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa 1974); Iles v. Commonwealth, 476
S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1972); People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d
849 (1974).
89. 24 Ill. App. 3d 489, 321 N.E.2d 489 (1st Dist. 1974).
90. People v. Hill, 34 Ill. App. 3d 193, 206, 339 N.E.2d 405, 415 (5th Dist. 1975) (emphasis
added). See also Jones v. United States, 402 F.2d 639, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1968). "[Oince the
defense has brought the issue before the judge, . . . there is a duty upon the judge to make
sufficient inquiry to inform himself on the relevant considerations. .. "
91. People v. Spicer, 44 111. App. 3d 200, 358 N.E.2d 104 (3d Dist. 1976); People v. Axelson,
37 Il. App. 3d 566, 346 N.E.2d 24 (2d Dist. 1976). If the trial judge grants the defendant's
motion to exclude prior convictions, it is error for him to reverse that ruling after the defen-
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Cross-Examinationvs. Certified Copy

In Illinois there is an important distinction between the testifying
defendant and all other witnesses. While a witness can be crossexamined about a prior conviction, 2 a defendant-witness can only
be impeached by introducing a certified copy of the past conviction.9 However, if the procedure is not followed, it is not clear
whether error or reversible error has been committed. In People v.
Neukom 4 the defendant was convicted of robbery and alleged that
the court committed error when it allowed the State's Attorney to
ask him on cross-examination whether he had been convicted of
previous infamous crimes. In rebuttal the State introduced the record of defendant's past conviction. The supreme court held that
the introduction of the record cured the error. This apparently invited prosecutors to go through the impeachment process twice:
once on cross-examination and once in rebuttal to cure the error
committed, on cross-examination.
The court retracted slightly in People v. McCrimmon 5 when it
indicated that it did not intend to approve a double method of crossexamination. In People v. Madison,"9 the court re-affirmed the rule
allowing impeachment of a criminal defendant only by certified
copy. Any indication to the contrary in People v. Neukom was to
be given no effect. However, the court found only harmless error.
The supreme court's disposition of the problem in Madison has not
been lost on the appellate courts. The most often used expression
of the process of proof is "that cross-examination of a defendant as
to a prior conviction is not an approved practice but does not constitute reversible error when, in addition to the questioning, the record
is also admitted. . . ."" This whole question may be a mere quibdant testifies. People v. Cooper, IIl. App. 3d , 383 N.E.2d 768 (5th Dist. 1978).
92. People v. Hoffman, 399 Ill. 57, 77 N.E.2d 195 (1948). Witnesses and parties in civil
cases can be cross-examined concerning their past convictions. For this purpose habeas corpus and bastardy proceedings are regarded as civil cases. Hewes v. Michael, 189 II. App. 495
(1st Dist. 1914); Borelli v. Lohman, 13 Ill. 2d 506, 150 N.E.2d 116 (1958).
93. E.g., People v. Bennett, 413 IlI. 601, 110 N.E.2d 175 (1953). It is proper to produce
the circuit court clerk to testify as to the fact that the record exists. People v. Smith, 63 Il.
App. 2d 369, 211 N.E.2d 456 (2d Dist. 1966). If the record is lost, a judge's affidavit will be
sufficient. People v. Rowland, 36 111. 2d 311, 223 N.E.2d 113 (1967). If the trial judge presided
at the previous trial he may take judicial notice of the prior conviction. People v. Davis, 65
Ill. 2d 157, 357 N.E.2d 792 (1976).
94. 16 Il.2d 340, 158 N.E.2d 53 (1959).
95. 37 Il.2d 40, 224 N.E.2d 822 (1967).
96. 56 11. 2d 476, 309 N.E.2d 11 (1974).
97. People v. Chisum, 30 I11.
App. 3d 546, 547, 333 N.E.2d 546, 547 (2d Dist. 1975). See
also People v. Blythe, 17 11.App. 3d 768, 308 N.E. 2d 675 (4th Dist. 1974).
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ble. If improper cross-examination will riot result in a reversal, then
perhaps it is not really error at all.
THE RECORD

One problem raised with some consistency is whether the trial
judge must give some affirmative indication that he has exercised
his discretion. Defendants frequently contend that the trial judge
has either failed to exercise his discretion, or failed to consider all
the relevant factors enunciated by Montgomery. While appellate
courts require some indication that the discretion was exercised, the
exact methodology used by the trial court appears to be insulated
from attack. In People v. Washington,5 the supreme court noted
that "it would normally be assumed that a trial judge had given
appropriate consideration to the relevant factors without requiring
a specific evaluation in open court of each of them ...
This approach seems particularly unhelpful and has probably
contributed significantly to the erosion of the Montgomery balancing test. While Montgomery announced a number of factors for the
trial court's consideration, there is no way to insure that the trial
courts will follow the decision. If none of the factors need be enunciated on the record, it becomes impossible for an appellate court to
adequately supervise this discretion. This may account for some of
the outlandish rationales employed by appellate courts to justify
upholding the lower court decision.1°°
In the federal courts the requirement is exactly the opposite. The
decision to admit or exclude is generally made at a hearing on the
record. 1 This does not mean that federal decisions under Rule 609
.

98. 55 fll. 2d 521, 304 N.E.2d 276 (1973).
99. Id. at 523-24, 304 N.E.2d at 277. See also People v. Graham, 27 Ill. App. 3d 408, 327
N.E.2d 261 (5th Dist. 1975). It appears that unless the record shows that the trial judge did
not consider the prejudicial effect of the past conviction, the reviewing court will assume that
the discretion was appropriately exercised. People v. Owens, 58 11. App. 3d 37, 373 N.E.2d
848 (4th Dist. 1978).
100. One would almost prefer that appellate courts use a "harmless" error rationale here.
It seems that if appellate courts find a violation of Montgomery, a reversal is proper. Better
direction to the trial courts could be provided if the appellate courts required that the determination be made on the record subject to review. The flaws in the reasoning could then be
pointed out for correction in the future. If the Montgomery issue did not substantially affect
the verdict, the appellate court could use a harmless error doctrine.
101. "In the future to avoid the unnecessary raising of the issue of whether the judge
has meaningfully invoked his discretion under Rule 609, we urge trial judges to
make such determinations after a hearing on the record,. . . and to explicitly find
that the prejudicial effect of the evidence to the defendant will be outweighed by
its probative value."
United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976).
See also United States v. Bianco, 419 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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are a model of uniformity. That can hardly be expected under a
discretionary model of decision making. However, the bases of the
trial court decision are fully expressed and are subject to critical
evaluation by the reviewing court. 02 Illinois should adopt this system. While it is generally agreed that relevancy problems, even in
an impeachment context, must be handled in a discretionary format, "" trial courts cannot simply be turned loose to do "justice." It
is necessary to define and limit the factors to be used by the trial
court in exercising that discretion, if it is to be at all controllable.
Montgomery attempted this. However, the Washington opinion
undermines this effort. If trial judges need not account for how their
decisions are made, there is no effective control over the discretionary process.
THE EFFECT OF MONTGOMERY

Montgomery's effect on the impeachment process has been variable at best. Occasionally, trial courts do an effective job,0 4 but other
cases reveal that little thought is being given to these problems.
Thus courts have widened the scope of admissible convictions and
have freely admitted past convictions of crimes similar to the crime
charged. In addition, there is little evidence that the full range of
factors enunciated in Montgomery and Gordon is being considered.
The trend of the cases seems to be bringing Illinois back to the preMontgomery era, without the "infamous crimes" limitation. If continued unabated this trend will allow admission of practically all
convictions that fall within the ten year rule. This hardly accords
with the spirit and rationale of Montgomery.
THE PROPOSED ILLINOIS RULE

The Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Evidence proposed a
Rule 609 that would significantly change the Montgomery calcu102. See, e.g., the splendidly articulated differences by Judges Weinstein and Elfvin as
to the weight of the different factors in the 609 calculus. Compare United States v. Jackson,
405 F. Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) with United States v. Brown, 409 F. Supp. 890 (W.D.N.Y.
1976). Such opinions are impossible in Illinois. As long as there is no suggestion that trial
courts place the rationale for their decisions on the record, the entire Montgomery balance
will remain cloudy.
103. See Dolan, Rule 403: The PrejudiceRule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 220 (1976).
104. For example, occasionally a court indicates that of all prior convictions that could
be used, only one or two will be admitted. See People v. Beltran, 51 111. App. 3d 810, 367
N.E.2d 273 (2d Dist. 1977), where the trial court admitted only one of the defendant's four
prior convictions for robbery. However, in People v. Owens, 46 Ill. App. 3d 978, 361 N.E.2d
644 (1st Dist. 177), the court admitted multiple convictions to dispel any idea that the
defendant had a clean record after the first conviction.
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lus. "' 5 The Rule departs from the Proposed Federal Rule adopted in
Montgomery in sections (a) and (b) and adds a new section (f).
One major change is in the ten year rule. No longer would there
be an absolute bar against the use of any conviction over ten years
old. While the Proposed Rule apparently contains a presumption
against admissibility of such ancient convictions, the trial court
may admit such a conviction if it finds that the probative value
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. The section is somewhat puzzling. First, it retains the release from prison prison dating
system without giving any reasons for its retention. Secondly, it uses
the same balancing formulation as section (a), thus rendering
subsection (b) almost unnecessary. Under the Federal Rule this
section was designed to set a terminus date on prior convictions and
to make it extremely difficult to use convictions over ten years old.
Here, by using the same standard for convictions over and under ten
years, the Committee's Proposed Rule might well encourage use of
these old convictions, which is hardly desirable.
Section (f) is also rather puzzling. It requires the proponent of the
conviction to notify the opponent of his intent to use prior convictions. At first glance it seems as if this section is hardly necessary.
It appears to have as its sole purpose the prevention of surprise to
the witness. However, a witness or a party could hardly be taken by
surprise when prior convictions are brought out, for surely a person
knows if he or she has been convicted. Moreover, convictions are a
matter of public record and can be found easily enough by anyone
interested in looking.
However, it is possible that this section may have another pur105. PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 609:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him during
cross-examination or established by public record but only if the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect to a party and the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever
is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
(f) Fair Opportunity to Contest. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible unless
the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent
to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest
the use of such evidence.
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pose. The reason for notice of intent to use past convictions is to
make sure that the opposing party has a chance to contest its use.
This implies an opportunity prior to trial to contest admissibility,
since the proponent must disclose his intent before the trial. If this
section is interpreted to require the trial judge to hold a hearing, on
the record, and rule on a motion in limine, then it will be very
beneficial. There is no reason why such a hearing could not be held.
Adequate disclosure of a conviction would enable the opponent of
the conviction's admission to present all the relevant data to the
trial judge at the in limine hearing. If all the information is available, a trial judge would only rarely be justified in withholding his
ruling until trial.
It is section (a), however, which attempts the major change in
Illinois practice. First it addresses itself to the method of proof,
providing that an appropriate conviction shall be admitted if elicited from the witness during cross-examination or established by
public record. This would eliminate the present Illinois dichotomy
of proof between a criminal defendant-witness and all other witnesses. Under this provision a criminal defendant who testifes can
be cross-examined about his prior convictions, instead of restricting
proof to the introduction of a certified copy of the record. The use
of the word "or" in the Rule suggests that the two methods are
mutually exclusive. The proponent of the conviction may choose one
method or the other, but may not use both. This clearly eliminates
the problem of "double impeachment" which has haunted the
Illinois cases.'"
This change would be helpful in eliminating the presently existing
confusion. Present case law's finding of harmless error in "double
impeachment" situations encourages overuse of the past conviction.
There is no indication that eliciting the information from the
defendant-witness is any more prejudicial than reading the record
of conviction. Federal practice requires proof of conviction on crossexamination, either through questioning the witness or by certified
copy.' "7 The federal procedure works quite well. There is no reason
for Illinois to continue this split method.
The second change envisioned by section (a) is more important.
It provides that no conviction should be admitted unless the proba106. See notes 92-97 supra and accompanying text.
107. FED. R. EvID. 609(a) provides:
"General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination.
See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 7,
609 [03al
at 80.2.
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tive value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. This is the
exact reverse of Montgomery, which held that the prejudicial effect
had to substantially exceed the probative value to justify excluding
the past conviction. Presumably this new provision would drastically cut back on the number of admissible past convictions. Under
the Montgomery standard, the opponent of the conviction must
show why it is prejudicial, but this proposal would require the proponent of the conviction and the trial judge to indicate why it is
probative. This would require greater analysis by the trial court in
relating the conviction to testimonial deception.1°s
The dissenting members of the Committee attacked this Proposed Rule as illogical, 0 9 but it is so only if the premise that past
convictions relate to credibility is accepted. The majority obviously
believed that only the exceptional conviction is probative of credibility. The focus of their disagreement is really the question of
whether knowledge of character is at all useful in an evaluation of
a person's actions, and particularly whether that knowledge can aid
in determining if the witness will lie under oath.
Ultimately, the past convictions problem is a specific manifestation of the more general question of the role of character evidence
in the trial process. Outside of the impeachment area, the law has
taken a very skeptical attitude toward character evidence. It is
rarely admitted in civil matters, except for those few cases where
character is actually in issue. In criminal cases the defendant may
introduce evidence of his good character, but proof of the commission of a crime by this method is forbidden unless the defendant
takes the initiative. The reasons for this extreme reluctance to use
character proof are well established. The inference from past conduct to present conduct is very weak, resting on the dubious assumption that because a person has acted in a certain way before,
he will do so again. The inquiry is prejudicial and time consuming.
Thus character evidence is normally excluded when offered substantively.
108. It is entirely possible, of course, that the change will have little effect on Illinois
practice. The rationale of the Fourth and First Appellate Districts is that all convictions of
crimes carrying a prison sentence of over one year are presumed to relate to veracity. See notes
64-76 supra and accompanying text. This rationale could easily justify continuing to admit
all convictions, thus effectively nullifying any change in the balancing standard.
109. Whereas present Illinois law favors impeachment by evidence of prior conviction, the adopted rule strongly disfavors the use of such evidence . . . .Moreover, the adopted rule strongly disfavors for impeachment purposes even evidence
of conviction of crimes which are reflective of dishonesty or false statement. This
approach to evidence so peculiarly probative of credibility is illogical.
PROPOSED ILL. R. Evm. 609, Minority Discussion (Final Draft).
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The extensive use of character evidence through past convictions
in the impeachment process is a strange contrast. Its use for impeachment assumes that character evidence which tends to prove
lying is probative. This is directly contrary to the general assumption that character evidence is not probative if offered substantively. Thus, character evidence offered to prove stealing is not probative and therefore inadmissible, while character evidence offered
to prove lying is probative and is therefore admissible. There is
absolutely no logical justification for such a view. The evidence is
not more probative in the impeachment process. It is arguable that
the evidence is actually less probative when related to credibility.
When a defendant testifies in his own defense he can hardly be
considered an objective witness. The defendant's interest in the
outcome is sufficient impeachment. Furthermore, the other side of
the relevancy equation is just as applicable when character evidence
is offered for impeachment, since the evidence is just as prejudicial
as when offered substantively. There is still a tremendous risk that
the jury will misuse the evidence and convict the defendant because
of the type of person he is.
Thus the formulation of Proposed Illinois Rule 609(a), insofar as
it restricts the admissibility of prior convictions, is salutory. However, it does not go far enough. The admission of any past conviction
assumes both that character traits exist and that people act in accordance with those traits. Psychologists have demonstrated that
such traits do not exist." 0 Therefore evidence of character to prove
conduct can never have any probative value. However, most people
assume the existence of such traits and expect people to act in
accordance with them,"' so in psychological terms, the evidence is
clearly prejudicial.
There can be no real argument that the trial process should include clearly prejudicial evidence with no probative value. The most
effective reform for Illinois would be the complete abolition of Rule
609. The criminal trial process aims at a result determined by evidence concerning the commission of a crime, not by the people
110. E.g., H. HARTSHORNE & M. MAY, STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER: 1 STUDIES IN
DECEIT 15 (1928). The relation of psychology to the legal system's perception of character is
extensively discussed in Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for its Withdrawal, 32 Okla. L. Rev.
(1979).
111. One of the most enduring propositions discovered by psychologists is that most
people attribute their own action to situational and environmental concerns. However, they
attribute the same action in others to stable personality dispositions. See generally K.
SHAvER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ATTRIBUTION PROCESSES (1975); A. HASTORF, D. SCHNEIDER, & J.
POLEFKA, PERSON PERCEPTION

(1970).
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involved. The continued existence of past convictions in the impeachment process thwarts that goal. Its elimination will considerably further the trial process. As one Illinois judge has cogently
stated: "The rule, which has no historical sanctity serves no useful
purpose and is discriminatory and unfair and should be abolished.
Its retention in this day of supposedly enlightened jurisprudence is
disgraceful.""'
112.

Ashcraft, Evidence of Former Convictions, 41 Cm. B. REc. 303, 307 (1960).

